Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms by Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No 20/08 
Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 
 
by 
Ola Kvaløy 
Trond E. Olsen 
 
 
 
 
 
SNF project no 7231 
 
“Team incentives, human capital and job satisfaction” 
 
Funded by The Research Council of Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
BERGEN, MAY 2008 
ISSN 1503-2140 
 
 
 
  
© Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale 
med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. 
Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale 
og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart 
og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. 
Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms
Ola Kvaløy∗ and Trond E. Olsen†
May 19, 2008
Abstract
The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce co-
operation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational
contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents).
The agents can cooperate by helping each other, i.e. provide eﬀort that
increases the performance of their peer without aﬀecting their own per-
formance. We extend the existing literature on agent-cooperation by
analyzing the implications of incomplete contracts and agent hold-up.
A main result is that if the agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently high,
then it is suboptimal for the principal to implement cooperation, even
if helping eﬀort is productive per se. This implies, contrary to many
property rights models, that social surplus may suﬀer if the investing
parties (here the agents) are residual claimants. The model also shows
that long-term relationships facilitate cooperation even if the agents
cannot monitor or punish each others eﬀort choices.
1 Introduction
There seems to be a consensus among scholars in human resource man-
agement (HRM) that teamwork or cooperation is particularly important in
knowledge-intensive organizations. It is argued that teams are essential for
knowledge sharing and innovation (see e.g. Cano and Cano, 2006), and that
knowledge-intensive firms should therefore adopt compensation plans that
reward cooperation (see e.g. Balkin and Banister, 1993). In this paper we
argue that, although it may well be the case that teamwork is important
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in human-capital-intensive firms, one should also expect a positive relation-
ship between a firm’s human-capital-intensity and the costs of implementing
cooperation.
It is a well known result from the theory of task allocation that cooper-
ation between employees is favorable if there are complementarities between
their eﬀorts, see e.g. Drago and Turnbull (1988, 1991), Itoh (1991, 1992),
Holmström and Milgrom (1990), Ramakrishnan, and Thakor (1991), Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, (1993), for static relationships, and Che and Yoo
(2001) for the case of repeated peer-monitoring. But these results are de-
duced from models assuming that the employees can commit to contracts
inducing any kind of cooperative behavior. In this paper we show that if
instead employees posses some form of hold-up power, then it may be sub-
optimal to implement cooperation, i.e. induce the employees to help each
other, even if cooperation is productive per se.
An employee has hold-up power if he is able to prevent his employer from
realizing his value added. In order to be in such a position, the employee
must possess some kind of ownership rights to critical assets. According to
the standard view of ownership, it is the owner of an asset who has residual
control rights; that is “the right to decide all usages of the asset in any
way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or law” (Hart, 1995).
An employee is typically considered to be an agent without residual control
rights, and hence not in a position to exercise hold-up power. It is the firm
that holds critical assets, not its workers.
However, in knowledge-intensive firms the allocation of ownership rights
is blurred. The main assets involved there are often the employees’ minds
and knowledge1. Their human capital can make them indispensable, and they
can threaten to walk away with ideas, clients or new production technologies.
When ownership is not associated with clear rights to control critical assets,
the firm runs the risk of being expropriated or held-up by its own employees
(see e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2001).
In this paper we show that when employees (agents) are in a position
to hold-up their employer (principal), it is costly to implement cooperation
between the agents. The intuition is as follows: In order to induce coop-
eration, the principal must implement some form of group-based incentive
1Based on Lavoie and Roy (1998), OECD measures the knowledge intensity of an in-
dustry by quantifying an industry’s knowledge base from its R&D and human capital
characteristics. The latter refers to the share of workers in certain knowledge based oc-
cupations. Knowledge based occupations are defined as those that “mainly involve the
production of knowledge and/or the provision of expert opinion.” (OECD 2001: 16), and
are classified into five subcategories; applied science, pure science, engineering, computer
science and social sciences and humanities.
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schemes that makes it profitable for the agents to help each other, i.e. to
provide costly eﬀort that increases the performance of their peers without af-
fecting their own performance. But group-based pay is susceptible to agent
hold-up since an agent who performs well in a given period, is tempted to
hold-up output and renegotiate his pay if his peers’ performances are poor
that period. He thereby obstructs the incentive scheme necessary for imple-
menting cooperation. The parties can mitigate this hold-up problem through
repeated interaction, i.e. through self-enforcing relational contracting where
contract breach is punished, not by the court, but by the parties themselves
who can refuse to engage in relational contracting after a deviation.2 Since
a hold-up will be regarded as a deviation from such a relational contract,
the self-enforcing range of the contract is limited by the hold-up problem.
If the agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently high, it may therefore be more
costly to implement a relational contract inducing helping eﬀort, than to
just implement individualized incentives that trigger non-cooperative eﬀort.
Interestingly, it follows from the analysis that not only the principal’s
profit, but also the social surplus may decrease if the agents’ hold-up power
is suﬃciently high. This is at variance with the established idea from the
property rights approach that the investing parties, the agents in our model,
should be residual claimants (Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart and
Moore, 1990). In our model, residual control rights in the hands of the
agents trigger own eﬀorts, but obstruct the principal from implementing so-
cially eﬃcient cooperation.
A secondary result from our analysis is that long-term relationships fa-
cilitate agent-cooperation even if the agents cannot monitor or punish each-
others eﬀort decisions. This result complements the existing literature on
team incentives in repeated settings, such as Che and Yoo (2001) where re-
peated peer-monitoring makes cooperation easier to sustain.3 In our model,
a higher discount factor eases the implementation of relational contracts,
making it less costly for the principal to implement cooperation even if there
is no peer sanctioning
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider the problem of im-
2Influential models of relatonal contracts include Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy ( 2002), MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989) generalize the case of symmetric information, while Levin (2003) makes a
general treatment of relational contracts with asymmetric information, allowing for incen-
tive problems due to moral hazard and hidden information.
3Radner (1986), Weitzman and Kruse, (1990), and FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) have all
pointed out that the folk theorem of repeated games provides a possible answer to the free
rider critique of group incentives. But Che and Yoo (2001) is the first to demonstrate this
in a repeated game between the agents. See also Ishida (2006).
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plementing agent cooperation in a relational contracting model. It is also
the first paper to consider the eﬀect of agent hold-up on helping eﬀort. The
paper is related to our companion paper (Kvaløy and Olsen, 2007), where we
investigate the problem of implementing peer-dependent incentives schemes
when agents are ex post indispensable.4 But that paper does not consider a
multitask situation where the agents are allowed to help each other, which is
the main feature of the model presented here. In spirit, the paper is related
to Auriol and Friebel (2002) who show how limited principal commitment
in a two period model of career concerns can reduce the agents’ incentives
to help each other, since the agents expect that their relative productivity
in period one will determine their fixed salary in period two. In our model,
their are no internal career concerns, i.e. productivity and expected wage re-
main the same in all periods. What drives the results is the agents’ potential
exploitation of ex post outside opportunities.
Broadly speaking, a contribution of the paper, together with our com-
panion paper (Kvaløy and Olsen, 2007), is to consider the eﬀect of residual
control rights in a multiagent moral hazard model. In the vast literature
on multiagent moral hazard it is (implicitly) assumed that residual control
rights are exclusively in the hands of the principal. And in the growing liter-
ature dealing with optimal allocation of control rights, the multiagent moral
hazard problem is not considered. (This literature begins with Grossman and
Hart, 1986; and Hart and More,1990,5 who analyze static relationships. Re-
peated relationships are analyzed in particular by Halonen, 2002; and Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy, 2002). A contribution of the paper is thus to consider
the eﬀect of workers possessing residual control rights when the firm faces a
multiagent moral hazard problem.
2 The Model
There are basically two kinds of agent-cooperation. One is where agents
cooperate performing a common task, a second is where agents help each
other performing each others’ tasks. In this paper we focus on the latter
since it represents the purest form of cooperative behavior. In particular
we assume that an agent who helps his peer does not increase his chance to
succeed on his own task, cet par.
4Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) analyze peer-monitoring and collusion in a relational con-
tracting model with no agent-hold-up.
5Although Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a model with many agents, they do not
consider the classical moral hazard problem that we address, where a principal can only
observe a noisy measure of the agents’ eﬀort.
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We consider a relationship between a principal and two agents (i = 1, 2),
who each period can either succeed or fail when performing a task for their
principal. Success yields high value QH , while failure yields low value QL.
The agents can exert eﬀort in order to increase the probability of success on
their own task. In addition they can help each other and thereby increase
the probability of success for their peer. Let ei denote agent i’s own eﬀort
and ai denote helping eﬀort. Eﬀorts can be either high (1) or low (0), where
high eﬀort has a cost c for own eﬀort and cA for helping eﬀort. Low eﬀort
is costless. The probabilities for success is then Pr(success) = pi(ei, aj) for
agent i.6
Our restrictions on eﬀort levels make it impossible for an agent who exert
high eﬀort on his own project, to trade-oﬀ helping eﬀort with ’even higher’
own eﬀort. This is done for tractability reasons, and is not necessary for
our main results to go through. However, it is not entirely unrealistic to
assume that there is a limit on how much valuable eﬀort an agent can exert
on a given project. If the agent has more time to spend before starting on
tomorrow’s project, he can spend it on helping others. Proof-reading papers
can serve as an example. There is a limit on how many times you can read
your own paper, and still find new errors. Reading your colleague’s paper,
and make him read yours, may though be valuable.
We assume that the principal can only observe the realization of the
agents’ output, not the level of eﬀort they choose. Similarly, agent i can only
observe agent j ’s output, not his eﬀort level. Whether or not the agents can
observe each others eﬀort choices is not decisive for the analysis presented.
However, by assuming that eﬀort is unobservable among the agents, we get
stronger results, since we do not need to rely on repeated peer monitoring
and peer-sanctions.
We assume that if the parties engage in an incentive contract, agent i
receives a bonus vector β ≡ (βHH , βHL, βLH , βLL) where the subscripts refer
to respectively agent i and agent j ’s realization of Qk and Ql , k, l ∈ {L,H}.
Agent i ’s expected wage is then
ωi = pi [pjβHH + (1− pj)βHL] + (1− pi) [pjβLH + (1− pj)βLL] (1)
= pi [pj (βHH − βLH) + (1− pj) (βHL − βLL)] + pj (βLH − βLL) + βLL
It is assumed that all parties are risk neutral, but that the agents are subject
6The basic set-up is a simple version of the more general model analyzed by Hideshi Itoh
in his seminal 1991- paper. For tractability reasons, our relational contracting extension
makes it necessary to simplify Itoh’s set up.
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to limited liability: the principal cannot impose negative wages.7 Ex ante
outside options are normalized to zero.
2.1 Optimal contract when output is verifiable
We first consider the least cost incentive contract when output is verifiable.
The principal will minimize wages subject to the constraint that the agents
must be induced to yield the desired levels of eﬀort and help. Let the prob-
ability levels for each agent be denoted:
pi(ei, aj) = q11 if both ei, aj high (ei = aj = 1)
pi(ei, aj) = q10 if high eﬀort ei, but no help (ei = 1, aj = 0)
pi(ei, aj) = q01 if low eﬀort, but help (ei = 0, aj = 1)
pi(ei, aj) = q00 if neither eﬀort nor help (ei = aj = 0)
Suppose the principal wants to implement high eﬀort and help from both
agents. The incentive compatibility constraints (IC) for each agent can then
be written as follows (see the appendix for details). IC for not shirking own
eﬀort, but maintain help:
q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL) ≥
c
(q11 − q01)
(ICe)
IC for not shirking help, but maintain own eﬀort.
q11 (βHH − βHL) + (1− q11) (βLH − βLL) ≥
cA
(q11 − q10)
(ICa)
The left hand side (LHS) of ICe is the expected gain from obtaining high
rather than low own output; the RHS is the cost per unit increase in the
probability of success that follows when eﬀort is increased. Condition ICa
admits a similar interpretation, where the LHS is the expected gain to the
agent when his partner realizes high rather than low output. In addition to
these two constraints there is an IC constraint for not shirking both eﬀort
and help.8 We show in the appendix that this constraint is satisfied when
the former two both hold.
As seems reasonable, we will assume here that helping eﬀort is less pro-
ductive than own eﬀort, in the sense that the cost per unit increase in the
7Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit firms
from extracting payments from workers.
8With "shirking", we mean "low eﬀort." With "eﬀort and help" we mean both high
own eﬀort and high helping eﬀort.
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probability of success is highest for helping eﬀort. For reasons that will be-
come clear below, we will further invoke the technical assumption that this
cost exceeds the sum (cA + c) /q11, so that we have
cA
(q11 − q10)
> max
½
c
(q11 − q01)
,
cA + c
q11
¾
(A1)
Now, using ICe in the expression (1) for the expected wage cost ω1 for
agent 1 we obtain (since p1 = p2 = q11)
ω1 ≥ p1
c
(q11 − q01)
+ p2 (βLH − βLL) + βLL
= q11
c
(q11 − q01)
+ q11βLH + (1− q11)βLL (2)
Similarly, using ICa in the expression (1) for ω1 yields
ω1 ≥ q11
cA
(q11 − q10)
+ q11βHL + (1− q11)βLL (3)
Due to limited liability (βij ≥ 0) and assumption A1 we then have
ω1 ≥ q11
cA
(q11 − q10)
.
= ωV (cA, q)
where ωV (cA, q) is defined by the equality. Also, this lower bound for the
wage cost can be attained by setting βLL = βHL = 0, and by A1 it will
exceed the total eﬀort cost c + cA. In the appendix it is shown that this
scheme also satisfies the IC condition for not shirking both eﬀort and help.
Thus we have:
Lemma 1 Given assumption A1, then if output is verifiable the minimal
wage cost (per agent) to implement eﬀort & help is given by ωV (cA, q). This
minimal cost is attained for βLL = βHL = 0 and ICa binding.
Note that a cost minimizing scheme has βLL = 0 and βHL = 0, hence
it has the feature that an agent never gets a bonus if his partner has a
bad outcome. This stimulates cooperation, and is the least costly way to
do so when help is less productive than own eﬀort. The bonus scheme has
ICa binding (so q11βHH + (1 − q11)βLH = cAq11−q10 ) and must satisfy ICe (so
q11 (βHH − βLH) ≥ cq11−q01 ). The latter naturally requires that an agent’s
bonus when both he and his peer succeed must exceed his bonus when he
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himself fails but his partner succeeds. We see from the IC conditions that
these two bonuses are not completely pinned down, but that one feasible
choice is to set βLH = 0 and q11βHH =
cA
q11−q10 .
Case: additive probabilities. It will be instructive to consider an
additive structure where we have
qij = ri + sj, with r1 − r0 = r > 0 and s1 − s0 = s > 0 (4)
This specification implies that the marginal productivity of help ((qi1 −
qi0)(QH − QL)) is independent of the level of eﬀort and vice versa. In this
case assumption A1 is equivalent to assuming cAs >
c
r , i.e. assuming that
helping eﬀort is less productive than own eﬀort. This holds because we here
have q11 = r + s+ q00 and thus q11max
©
c
r ,
cA
s
ª
≥ c+ cA.
We will focus on cases where it is optimal for the firm to implement both
eﬀort and help when output is verifiable. The lemma shows that the profit
generated by doing so is
Π11 = 2QL + 2 [q11∆Q− ωV (cA, q)] ,
where∆Q = QH−QL. For this to be optimal the last term must be positive,
and this profit must dominate the profit generated by just implementing eﬀort
without help; i.e.9
Π11 ≥ Π10 = 2QL + 2q10
∙
∆Q− c
(q10 − q00)
¸
It must also dominate the profit generated by just implementing help without
own eﬀort, i.e.
Π11 ≥ Π01 = 2QL + 2q01
∙
∆Q− cA
(q01 − q00)
¸
All this will hold if∆Q is suﬃciently large, or if (q01 − q00) and (q10 − q00) are
both ’small’ and (q11 − q01) and (q11 − q10) are both ’large’, i.e. if eﬀort and
help are very productive together but not so productive in isolation. More
formally we have:
Lemma 2 For verifiable output, and given assumption A1, it is optimal to
9An argument similar to that leading to (2) shows that the minimal cost to implement
eﬀort without help is q10c/ (q10 − q00).
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implement eﬀort & help when q11∆Q > ωV (cA, q), and in addition
∆Q ≥ max
½
1
q11 − q10
µ
ωV −
q10c
q10 − q00
¶
,
1
q11 − q01
µ
ωV −
q01cA
q01 − q00
¶¾
.
(A0)
For the additive model these conditions are equivalent to
∆Q ≥ cA
s
+
r + q00
s
(
cA
s
− c
r
)
2.2 Relational contracting
Assume now that output is non-verifiable. The incentive contract must then
be self-enforcing, and thus ‘relational’ by definition. We consider a multi-
lateral punishment structure where any deviation by the principal triggers
low eﬀort from both agents. The principal honors the contract only if both
agents honored the contract in all previous periods. The agents honor the
contract only if the principal honored the contract with both agents in all
previous periods. A natural explanation for this is that the agents interpret a
unilateral contract breach (i.e. the principal deviates from the contract with
only one of the agents) as evidence that the principal is not trustworthy (see
Bewley, 1999, and Levin, 2002).10
The relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if, for all parties, the
present value of honoring is greater than the present value of reneging. Ex
post realizations of values, the principal can renege on the contract by re-
fusing to pay the promised wage, while the agents can renege by refusing to
accept the promised wage, and instead hold-up values and renegotiate what
we can call a spot contract. The spot price is denoted ηQk. If values accrue
directly to the principal, then η = 0. But if the agent is able to hold-up values
ex-post, then η is determined by bargaining power, ex post outside options
and the ability to hold-up values.11 Assume that there exists an alternative
market for the agents’ output, and that the agents are able to independently
realize values θQk, θ ∈ (0, 1) ex post. If we assume Nash bargaining between
principal and agents, each agent will then receive θQk plus a share γ from the
surplus from trade i.e. θQk + γ(Qk − θQk) = ηQk where η = γ + θ(1− γ).12
10Modelling multilateral punishments is also done for convenience. Bilateral punish-
ments will not alter our results qualitatively.
11We take η as an exogenous parameter. In Kvaløy and Olsen (2008) we endogenize
the agents’ hold-up power in a single-task model where relative performance evaluation is
optimal.
12It should be noted that the ability to hold-up values rests on the assumption that
agents become indispensable in the process of production (as in e.g. Halonen, 2002). We
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We will assume that eﬀort is not implementable in a spot contract, which
is the case if (q10 − q00)η∆Q < c, i.e.
η <
c
(q10 − q00)∆Q
≡ ηs (5)
This implies that the agent’s surplus in the spot contract equals the spot
price and is given by
us = S = ηQL + q00η∆Q (6)
As in e.g. Baker, Gibbons andMurphy (2002), we analyze trigger strategy
equilibria in which the parties enter into spot contracting forever after one
party reneges. I.e. if the principal reneges on the relational contract, both
agents insist on spot contracting forever after. And vice versa: if one of
the agents (or both) renege, the principal insists on spot contracting forever
after.
2.2.1 Relational contract constraints
Consider now the conditions for the incentive contract to be self-enforcing,
i.e. the conditions for implementing a relational incentive contract. The
relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if all parties honor the contract
for all possible values ofQk and Ql, k, l ∈ {L,H}. The parties decide whether
or not to honor the incentive contract ex post realization of output, but ex
ante bonus payments. Agents are treated symmetrically, and thus receive the
same contract (β) and obtain the same expected wage (ω). The principal
will honor the contract if
−βkl−βlk+
δ
1− δΠ
R ≥ −η (Qk +Ql)+
2δ
1− δ [QL + q00∆Q− S] , all k, l ∈ {L,H},
(EP)
where δ is the discount factor and ΠR is the principal’s profit in the relational
contract. The LHS of the inequality shows the principal’s expected present
value from honoring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present
value from reneging.
Each agent will honor the contract if
do not analyze the incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital (as in e.g Kessler
and Lülfesmann, 2006). Rather, we just assume that agents become indispensable ex post,
and then focus on how this aﬀects the multiagent moral hazard problem. We thus follow
the relational contracting literature, and abstract from human capital accumulation. The
expected output realization is therefore assumed to be constant each period. This allows
us to concentrate on stationary relational contracts where the principal promises the same
contingent compensation in each period.
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βkl +
δ
1− δ (ω − c− cA) ≥ ηQk +
δ
1− δus, all k, l ∈ {L,H}, (EA)
where similarly the LHS shows the agent’s expected present value from hon-
oring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from
reneging.
In addition to fulfilling these enforceability conditions, the contract must
also fulfill the IC conditions (ICe-a) for implementing help and eﬀort.
2.2.2 Cost minimization
We will now consider the implications of the enforceability conditions above
for the costs of implementing help and eﬀort in a relational contract. As
a first step we consider the minimal cost subject to EA, IC and limited
liability (βkl ≥ 0). We will show that this minimal cost as a function of the
agents’ hold-up parameter η is a piecewise linear, continuos and increasing
function. This shape reflects an increased tightening of the EA constraints
as the agent’s hold-up power increases.
Using first βLL ≥ 0 and EA for the bonus βHL in (3) (with ω1 = ω2 = ω)
we get
ω ≥ q11
cA
q11 − q10
+ q11
µ
ηQH +
δ
1− δ [us − ω + c+ cA]
¶
(7)
and hence, collecting terms involving ω:
ω ≥
µ
q11cA
q11 − q10
+ q11
µ
ηQH +
δ
1− δ [us + c+ cA]
¶¶
1− δ
1− δ + q11δ
≡ ωm(δ, η)
(8)
We see that ωm(δ, η) defined here is a lower bound for the cost (per agent),
and will be attained if the two constraints βLL ≥ 0 and EA for the bonus
βHL both bind.
Next, using EA for bonuses βHL and βLL in (3) we obtain
ω ≥ q11
cA
q11 − q10
+ q11η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us − ω + c+ cA] (9)
and hence
ω ≥ (1− δ)
∙
q11cA
q11 − q10
+ q11η∆Q+ ηQL
¸
+ δ [us + c+ cA] ≡ ωA(δ, η) (10)
11
The expression ωA(δ, η) defined here is also a lower bound for the cost,
and will be attained if the EA constraints for the bonuses βHL and βLL both
bind.
We have thus obtained two lower bounds for the wage payments that are
necessary in order to induce a worker to exert eﬀort on his own task as well
as help to his colleague. Note that ωA(δ, η) and ωm(δ, η) are both increasing
in η (the outside value us is also increasing in η), reflecting the eﬀect that it
generally becomes more costly to induce this behavior when the workers’ ex
post hold-up power increases.
The cost ωV (c, cA, q) defined for the verifiable case is of course also a lower
bound for wage costs in the present case. (This cost is derived from the IC
and limited liability conditions, which must hold also in the present case.)
So we must have ω ≥ max {ωV , ωm(δ, η), ωA(δ, η)}. We can show that the
cost defined by this expression is indeed the minimal cost to induce eﬀort
and help, subject to IC and EA (and limited liability).
Lemma 3 Given assumption A1, the minimal cost to implement eﬀort and
help, subject to IC and EA (and limited liability) is
min
IC,EA
ω = max {ωV , ωm(δ, η), ωA(δ, η)} ≡ ω11(δ, η)
With agent spot surplus us = ηQL + q00η∆Q we have the following: For
δ ∈ (0, 1] there exists ηa(δ) > ηm(δ) > 0 such that
ω11(δ, η) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ωV = q11cAq11−q10 for 0 ≤ η ≤ ηm(δ)
ωm(δ, η) for ηm(δ) < η ≤ ηa(δ)
ωA(δ, η) for ηa(δ) < η
(11)
Moreover, ηa(δ), ηm(δ) are increasing in δ and satisfy: (i) ηa(δ), ηm(δ) → 0
as δ → 0, and (ii) ηa(1) < ηs if and only if
ηsQL > ηs (q11 − q00)∆Q+ [ωV − c− cA] (12)
The lemma confirms that the cost function is piecewise linear, continuos
and increasing in η, and the reasoning preceding the lemma shows that this
shape reflects increased tightening of the EA constraints as the agent’s hold-
up power increases. For small η (η < ηm) the cost minimizing bonus scheme
for verifiable output does not violate any EA constraint, and neither of these
constraints are therefore binding. Each agent gets a rent (since ωV > c+cA),
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and their spot surplus is so low that they are not tempted to renegotiate.
This is the case even for the outcome pair QH , QL, where the agent’s own
output is high, but his bonus is βHL = 0. But for η = ηm the EA constraint
for this bonus just starts to bind. The principal is thus forced to modify the
initial scheme, where an agent never gets a bonus if his partner fails, into a
scheme where an agent gets a bonus if his partner fails, but the agent himself
does well (βHL > 0).
The EA constraint for the bonus βHL continues to bind for larger η, and
this implies increased wage costs for the principal, but it is the only binding
EA constraint for η < ηa. At this point the constraints start binding also
for the outcomes where the agent’s own output is low. For η > ηa the EA
constraints for the bonuses (βLH , βLL) associated with these outcomes are
also binding, implying even higher wage costs.
Figure 1 gives a partial illustration of how the wage cost increases with
increasing η for the case η > ηa. As we have seen, in that case the EA
constraints for the bonuses (βLH , βLL) are both binding, implying that these
bonuses are equal (βLH = βLL). This implies (i) that the IC constraints
can be written as functions of the two bonus diﬀerences βHH − βLH and
βHL − βLL, (ii) that the EA constraints then simply require that each of
these bonus diﬀerences must exceed η∆Q, and (iii) that the cost function (see
(1)) also can be written as a function of these bonus diﬀerences plus a ’fixed
term’ involving βLL. These properties allow us to draw lines representing IC
constraints, EA constraints and isocost curves as indicated in Figure 1.
ICa
ICe 
Isocost
45o 
EA
EA 
LLHL ββ −
LHHH ββ −
J 
A 
Figure 1
Regarding the IC constraints, note that while the bonus βHH stimulates
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own as well as helping eﬀort, the bonus βHL stimulates own eﬀort, but dis-
courages help. This implies that the lines representing ICe and ICa have
negative and positive slopes, respectively. The intercept of ICa is larger due
to the assumption that help is less productive than own eﬀort. The bonuses
that satisfy both IC constraints are then those on or above ICa.
By property (ii) the EA constraints here reduce to βHj − βLj ≥ η∆Q,
j = H,L, and can thus be represented by the L-shaped curve in the figure.
The EA constraints here impose the intuitively reasonable requirement that
an agent’s additional bonus for realizing a high rather than a low own output
cannot be lower than the diﬀerence between the spot prices of these outputs.
As η increases, the EA curve will move outwards in the figure.
By property (iii) isocost lines (for fixed η) can be drawn as indicated in
the figure; parallel to the ICe constraint. If there were no EA constraints,
the lowest cost would be attained for the bonuses represented by point J,
which corresponds (with βLH = βLL = 0) to the optimal solution for the
verifiable case (see Lemma 1). The EA constraints imply that this solution
is no longer feasible, and that the minimal cost will be realized at point A.
This point represents a higher cost partly because the agent’s ’fixed wage’ is
higher (βLH = βLL > 0) and partly because the additional bonuses for high
output are higher at point A than at point J. Both of these cost elements
will increase with increasing η.
The cost characterized in Lemma 3 will be attainable for the principal if
the associated bonuses also satisfy the EP conditions, so that the principal
is not tempted to renegotiate ex post. These conditions are more easily
satisfied, the larger is δ. The minimal cost given in the lemma will therefore
generally be attainable only if δ exceeds some critical level. We will return
to this issue below.
2.3 Optimal relational contract
We now turn to optimal contracts, with a particualar focus on the question
of whether the optimal contract induces the agents to exert both own eﬀort
and helping eﬀort, or just own eﬀort. A contract inducing just own eﬀort
from the agents is less costly, and may be easier to implement. But such a
contract will of course generate less gross value.
Given that the contract inducing help & eﬀort can be implemented, the
profit associated with this contract will be
ΠR11(δ, η) = 2QL + 2 [q11∆Q− ω11(δ, η)]
Since the wage cost increases with η, the profit decreases with η. For η = 0
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the EA constraints do not bind (we have S = us = 0 in this case), and the
profit for the relational contract is then equal to the profit for the verifiable
case (provided implementation, i.e. EP, is feasible). Thus we have
ΠR11(δ, η) ≤ Π11, ΠR11(δ, 0) = Π11 = 2QL + 2q11
∙
∆Q− cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
.
The next-to-last equality here presumes that δ is suﬃciently large to make
ωV implementable, i.e. to make the associated bonuses compatible with EP.
Alternatively, the principal could seek to implement a contract with eﬀort
but no help. We can show (see the appendix) that the wage cost per agent
for this contract is given by
ω10(δ, η) = max
½
q10c
q10 − q00
, ω0(δ, η)
¾
(13)
where q10cq10−q00 is the cost to implement eﬀort (and no help) in the verifiable
case, and
ω0(δ, η) = (1− δ)
∙
q10c
q10 − q00
+ ηQL
¸
+ δ [us + c] , (14)
This holds provided that δ is suﬃciently large to make the associated bonuses
implementable, i.e. compatible with EP. Given these provisions, the profit
associated with this contract is
ΠR10(δ, η) = 2QL + 2 [q10∆Q− ω10(δ, η)]
As above the profit decreases with η (because the cost ω0(δ, η) is increasing
in η), and we have (again provided implementation, i.e. EP is feasible):
ΠR10(δ, η) ≤ Π10, ΠR10(δ, 0) = Π10 = 2QL + 2q10
∙
∆Q− c
(q10 − q00)
¸
Wewill now investigate the conjecture that a contract inducing eﬀort&help
is optimal for small η, while a contract inducing only eﬀort is optimal for large
η. This amounts to the following:
ΠR11(δ, η) > Π
R
10(δ, η) for ’small’ η (and Π
R
11 implementable)
ΠR11(δ, η) < Π
R
10(δ, η) for ’large’ η (or Π
R
11 not implementable)
A weak interpretation of the conjecture is to say that there are discount
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factors where the first claim holds, and there are (possibly diﬀerent) discount
factors for which the second claim holds. We first provide two results that
confirm this version of the conjecture. A stronger interpretation is to say
that there is a set of discount factors such that both claims hold for each δ
in this set. Our last result will confirm this stronger and more interesting
version of the conjecture.
Consider first the case of small η. If the eﬀort&help contract is imple-
mentable for η = 0 (or η close to 0), then it is more profitable than the
contract inducing eﬀort alone if we just have
Π11 > Π10 i.e. q11
∙
∆Q− cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
> q10
∙
∆Q− c
(q10 − q00)
¸
(This inequality is implied by assumption A0.) We can now prove the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 1 Given Π11 > Π10, then for all η suﬃciently small there is
δ0 < 1 such that a contract inducing eﬀort & help is implementable and
optimal (ΠR11(δ, η) > ΠR10(δ, η)) for δ > δ0.
This result confirms that a contract inducing eﬀort and help dominates
a contract inducing only own eﬀort when η is small, provided the parties
are suﬃciently patient. It is worth noting that the proposition also shows
that high discount factors, which supports long-term relationships, facili-
tate agent-cooperation even when the agents cannot monitor or punish each
other’s eﬀort choices.
Proposition 1 is formulated for small η, but will in fact hold for any
η, in the sense that for each η one can find a critical discount factor such
that the contract inducing eﬀort and help is optimal for all δ exceeding
this critical level. This can be seen by noting that in the limit as δ → 1,
the wage cost for the eﬀort&help contract converges to us + c + cA (see (8-
10)), while the cost for the eﬀort alone contract converges to us + c (see
(14)).The profit diﬀerence thus converges to 2 [(q11 − q10)∆Q− cA], which is
positive by assumption. Moreover, for δ suﬃciently close to 1 the relational
contract constraints (EA,EP) will be satisfied, and hence both contracts can
be implemented. For large δ, where implementation of a relational contract
is not particularly challenging, the contract inducing eﬀort and help thus
remains optimal, also when the agents’ hold up power is large.
Having noted this, we move on to the case of small δ, where implemen-
tation of a relational contract is more of a challenge. The smaller is δ, the
harder it generally is to implement a relational contract. We will show that
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for large η it becomes relatively harder to implement a contract inducing
both eﬀort and help than a contract inducing eﬀort alone when δ becomes
small.
Consider first the contract inducing own eﬀort but no help. It follows
from the analysis in Kvaløy and Olsen (2007) that this contract gets easier
to implement as η increases. In fact, the critical discount factor for imple-
mentation goes to zero as η → ηs. This is quite intuitive, given that ηs was
defined as the minimal level of η for which the spot market yields suﬃcient
incentives for own eﬀort, see (5). Bonuses equal to spot prices (βkl = ηQk)
can be implemented for arbitrarily small δ; they satisfy the EA and EP con-
ditions for δ = 0. And when these bonuses are suﬃcient to induce eﬀort,
which they are for η = ηs, then eﬀort can be implemented at spot market
cost for any δ ≥ 0.
Implementing eﬀort and help, however, requires bonuses that deviate from
spot prices. While spot prices here can give suﬃcient incentives to induce
own eﬀort, they give no incentives at all for helping eﬀort. But when bonuses
must deviate from spot prices, a minimal δc > 0 is required in order to
implement these bonuses in a relational contract. If this was not the case,
implementable such bonuses would exist for arbitrarily small δ, and hence
in the limit (δ → 0) satisfy βkl + βlk ≤ η(Qk +Ql) from EP and βkl ≥ ηQk
from EA, implying βkl = ηQk, i.e. bonuses equal to spot prices for all k, l.
Hence bonuses diﬀerent from spot prices cannot be implemented for δ < δc,
for some critical discount factor δc > 0.
These arguments show that the critical discount factor for implementing
eﬀort and help is bounded away from zero for all η ≤ ηs, while the critical
factor for implementing eﬀort alone goes to zero as as η → ηs. This means
that there is some interval (ηc, ηs) of ’large’ η where the critical discount
factor for implementing eﬀort alone is smaller than the critical factor for
implementing both eﬀort and help. Thus we have
Proposition 2 There is ηc < ηs such that for η ∈ (ηc, ηs) eﬀort alone can
be implemented for δ ≥ δ(η) while eﬀort & help can only be implemented for
δ ≥ δc(η) > δ(η)
The proposition shows that for large η there will be an interval of discount
factors where only the contract inducing own eﬀort can be implemented, and
hence where this contract is optimal. Together with Proposition 1 this result
confirms the weak version of our conjecture, saying that if the agents’ hold-up
power η is small there are discount factors for which eﬀort&help is optimal,
while if this power is large there are discount factors for which eﬀort alone is
optimal.
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We now turn to the stronger and more interesting version of the conjec-
ture, dealing with comparisons of the contracts for a fixed discount factor
δ. To this end we consider the profit diﬀerence ΠR11(δ, η) − ΠR10(δ, η), and
show that there are parameters such that for a set of discount factors this
diﬀerence is positive when η is small and negative when η is large. From
Proposition 1 and the following discussion it is clear that this can occur only
for relatively small discount factors. For this reason we consider first the
limiting case δ → 0.
Note that for δ small, the relevant cost functions for a given η are ωA(δ, η)
for the eﬀort&help contract, and ω0(δ, η) for the eﬀort alone contract. (This
follows from Lemma 3 by noting that ηa(δ) → 0 as δ → 0, and from (14)
by noting that ω0(δ, η) > q10cq10−q00 for δ small.) For these cost functions we
obtain, from (10) and (14);
ωA(δ, η)− ω0(δ, η)→
µ
q11cA
q11 − q10
+ q11η∆Q
¶
− q10c
q10 − q00
as δ → 0
Consider now situations where the agents’ hold up power, as represented by
η, is large. So consider η close to the upper bound ηs introduced above, see
(5). Noting that the definition of ηs implies q11ηs∆Q =
q11c
q10−q00 , we see that
for η = ηs we have
ωA(δ, ηs)− ω0(δ, ηs)→
q11cA
q11 − q10
+
(q11 − q10) c
q10 − q00
as δ → 0
and consequently
¡
ΠR11(δ, ηs)−ΠR10(δ, ηs)
¢ 1
2
→ (q11−q10)∆Q−
µ
q11cA
q11 − q10
+
(q11 − q10) c
q10 − q00
¶
= D0
(15)
We see that, for given probability and cost parameters, this profit diﬀerence is
positive for ∆Q large, but negative otherwise. A large ∆Q will in this model
imply that help as well as eﬀort are quite productive. We have previously
seen (Lemma 2) that a contract inducing eﬀort and help is optimal in the
verifiable case only if ∆Q is not too small, i.e. only if both eﬀort and help
are suﬃciently productive. The interesting question now is therefore whether
there is a range of intermediate ∆Q0s such that eﬀort and help is optimal
in the verifiable case, but not optimal in the non-verifiable case, and in
particular such that the profit diﬀerence is negative (D0 < 0) while the
assumptions of Lemma 2 still hold.
To examine this issue, consider first the additive specification (4), for
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which we obtain
D0
q11 − q10
= ∆Q−
µ
1
s
(s+ r + q00) cA
s
+
c
r
¶
= ∆Q−
µµ
1 +
r + q00
s
¶
cA
s
+
c
r
¶
Comparing with the conditions in Lemma 2, we see that there is indeed a
range of ∆Q0s such that these conditions hold and yet D0 < 0. (Assumption
A1 implies here cAs >
c
r , and the range is then defined by
r+q00
s (
cA
s −
c
r) <
∆Q− cAs <
r+q00
s
cA
s +
c
r .) There is thus a range of intermediate∆Q
0s for which
a contract inducing eﬀort and help is optimal when output is verifiable, but
not necessarily so when output is non-verifiable.
We have so far not considered the implementability conditions EP for the
principal. Now, in the discussion leading up to Proposition 2 we saw that for
large η (close to ηs) implementation of eﬀort alone is indeed feasible even for
δ very small. Based on this we can therefore conclude the following.
Lemma 4 When
∆Q <
q11cA
(q11 − q10)2
+
c
(q10 − q00)
and (A0,A1) and (12) hold, there exists a η1 < ηs such that for every η ∈
(η1, ηs) there is an interval (δ(η), δ¯(η)) such that for δ ∈ (δ(η), δ¯(η)) we have
ΠR11(δ, η) < ΠR10(δ, η).
The conditions in this lemma are not particularly strict. A0 and A1 are
plausible assumptions, and (12) is compatible with the other conditions in
the proposition, since it is the only condition involving QL. This condition
holds in addition to the other ones if QL is suﬃciently large.
The lemma shows that if the agents’ hold up power η is high, then there
are discount factor intervals where eﬀort & help is dominated by eﬀort alone.
Using this lemma in combination with Proposition1 we can verify our initial
conjecture, and show that for a given discount factor, it is optimal to induce
cooperation when η is small, but not so if η is large.
Proposition 3 There is a set of parameters satisfying (A0, A1) and (12),
and for which the following is true. There is an interval (δ1, δ0) such that
for δ in this interval the contract inducing eﬀort & help is optimal for η
suﬃciently small (η close to 0), while the contract inducing only own eﬀort
and no help is optimal for η suﬃciently large (η close to ηs).
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This proposition has an interesting corollary. Since own eﬀort without
help yields a lower social surplus than own eﬀort and help together, a higher
η may reduce the social surplus:
Corollary: There is a set of parameters satisfying (A0, A1) and (12),
and for which the following is true. There is an interval (δ1, δ0) such that
for δ in this interval the social surplus is smaller when η is large ( η close to
ηs) than when η is small ( η close to 0).
This result is not in line with the established idea from the property
rights approach that the investing parties should be the residual claimants.
In our model - where the principal does not make any investment decisions
- this principle would indicate that the social surplus should increase when
the agents’ ex post share of value added (η) increases. But we see that the
opposite happens here: If η is suﬃciently high, then social surplus suﬀers
since the principal cannot implement eﬃcient cooperation (helping eﬀort).
If we interpret η as proxy for asset ownership, where a high η implies that the
agents own assets, then the corollary has implications for the theory of the
firm: It implies that if cooperation is valuable (and output is non-verifiable),
then the firm and not the agents should own the assets (at least for some
parameter configurations). The result is thus related to Holmström’s (1999)
claim - building on Alchian and Demsetz (1972) - that firms will arise in
situations where it is important to mitigate individual incentives and foster
cooperative behavior.
The model also implies that when cooperation is important, the firm
should be designed to dilute the agents’ hold-up power. This perspective
complements the literature on human capital and the problems of expropria-
tion, which focuses on how organizational design and incentive structure can
aﬀect the firm’s ability to protect strategic assets (see e.g. Liebeskind 2000;
Rebitzer and Taylor 2007; and Rajan and Zingales 1998, 2001).
3 Concluding remarks
In so-called knowledge-intensive industries we often hear managers stress the
importance of cooperation, team-work and knowledge sharing. And these
claims are not only accompanied by dry complementarity arguments. The
updated HR-manager would say that cooperation and helping-on-the job
increase job satisfaction, and she will even find scientific support for her claim
(Heywood et al. 2005). In contrast to these observations, empirical findings
suggest that the use individual incentives, as opposed to team incentives, is
higher in knowledge-intensive firms (see e.g. Long and Shields, 2005, and
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Barth et al. 2006), and some empirical findings also suggest that people with
more education are less satisfied with their job than people with lower levels
of education (Clark and Oswald, 1996).13
Our paper responds to these findings by showing that cooperation can
be more costly to implement in human capital-intensive industries. The
reason is that human capital blurs the allocation of ownership rights. As
noted by Liebeskind (2000), if human-capital intensive firms are unable to
establish intellectual property rights with respect to the ideas generated by
their employees, they run the risk of being expropriated or held-up by their
own employees. Our point is that this hold-up problem increases if the firm
encourages cooperation between its employees, since the incentive regimes
that are necessary to encourage cooperation are susceptible to employee hold-
up.
As noted, a higher hold-up power, η, decreases not only the firm’s surplus,
but also social surplus if it prevents the agents from helping each other. This
contrasts with the standard property rights argument that the investing party
(the agents in our paper) should own assets. We thus present a cost of
providing agents with ownership rights that can be explored further within
the modelling framework presented in this paper.
Finally, an interesting corollary that follows from the model is that long-
term relationships foster cooperation between agents even if the agents can-
not monitor or punish colleagues who free-ride, or refuse to cooperate. That
is; a higher discount factor eases implementation of relational contracts, mak-
ing it less costly for the principal to implement cooperation. This adds to the
literature, since peer-monitoring has been more or less the ”folk explanation”
of why repeated interaction foster cooperation at the workplace.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We first demonstrate that ICe-a are the relevant IC conditions. From (1)
and the definitions of the probabilities qij the condition for not shirking own
eﬀort is:
q11 [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)] + q11 (βLH − βLL)− c− cA
≥ q01 [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)] + q11 (βLH − βLL)− cA
A little algebra shows that this is equivalent to (ICe). Similarly, the condition
13And the layman reads magazines about stress, burning-out and pushy behavour in
the high-skilled workforce.
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for not shirking help;
q11 [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)] + q11 (βLH − βLL)− c− cA
≥ q11 [q10 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q10) (βHL − βLL)] + q10 (βLH − βLL)− c,
is seen to be equivalent to ICa.
We next show that a joint deviation, i.e. shirking both own eﬀort and
helping eﬀort, is not profitable for the agent. This holds if
q11 [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)] (IC-ae)
+q11 (βLH − βLL)− c− cA
≥ q01 [q10 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q10) (βHL − βLL)] + q10 (βLH − βLL)
We have from first ICa and then ICe above:
q11 [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)] + q11 (βLH − βLL)− c− cA
≥ q11 [q10 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q10) (βHL − βLL)] + q10 (βLH − βLL)− c
≥ (q11 − q01 + q01) [q10 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q10) (βHL − βLL)] + q10 (βLH − βLL)
− (q11 − q01) [q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)]
= (q11 − q01) (q10 − q11) [(βHH − βLH)− (βHL − βLL)]
+q01 [q10 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q10) (βHL − βLL)] + q10 (βLH − βLL)
Since (q11 − q01) (q10 − q11) < 0we see that IC-ae will indeed hold if (βHH − βLH)−
(βHL − βLL) ≥ 0. Now, the cost-minimizing bonuses satisfy this condition
since they satisfy βLL = βHL = 0 and from ICe βHH −βLH > 0. This proves
that IC-ae holds.
Assumption A1 further assures participation, since it implies ωV > c+cA.
This proves the lemma..
Proof of Lemma 2.
Condition A0 is just a diﬀerent way of writing Π11 ≥ Π10 and Π11 ≥ Π01.
For the additive model (4), the assumption cAq11−q10 >
c
q11−q01 is equivalent tocA
s >
c
r . Then we have ωV =
cA
s q11, and the condition q11∆Q > ωV is then
equivalent to ∆Q > cAs . Condition A0 is now
∆Q ≥ max
½
1
s
³q11cA
s
− q10c
r
´
,
1
r
³q11cA
s
− q01cA
s
´¾
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Using q11 = s+ q10 = r + q01, this is equivalent to
∆Q ≥ max
½
1
s
³
cA + q10
³cA
s
− c
r
´´
,
1
r
³rcA
s
´¾
=
cA
s
+
q10
s
³cA
s
− c
r
´
which coincides with the condition stated in the lemma, since q10 = r + q00.
Proof of Lemma 3.
The proof entails showing that the asserted minimum cost can be attained
by nonnegative bonuses that satisfy IC and EA. We first prove (11).
By construction of the functions ωm(δ, η) and ωA(δ, η) they satisfy, re-
spectively, (7) and (9) with equalities, thus;
ωm(δ, η) = ωV + q11
∙
η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us − ωm(δ, η) + c+ cA]
¸
, (16)
ωA(δ, η) = ωV + q11η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us − ωA(δ, η) + c+ cA] . (17)
Hence we have ωm(δ, η) = ωV for η = ηm > 0 that solves
η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us(η)− ωV + c+ cA] = 0 (18)
Substituting for us(η) = ηQL + q00η∆Q this yields
ηm =
δ [ωV − c− cA]
QL + (1− δ)∆Q+ δq00∆Q
> 0
Since ωm(δ, η) is increasing (linearly) in η, we have ωm(δ, η) > ωV iﬀ η > ηm.
Similarly we see from (17) that we have ωA(δ, η) = ωV for η = η0a given
by q11η∆Q+ ηQL + δ1−δ [us(η)− ωV + c+ cA] = 0. Comparing with (18) we
see that, since q11 < 1, this yields η0a > ηm, and hence ωA(δ, η) < ωV for
η < ηm.
We now claim that ωA(δ, η) = ωm(δ, η) for the unique η = ηa that solves
ωA(δ, η) = ωV + q11η∆Q, i.e. for η = ηa that solves (see (17))
ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us(η)− (ωV + q11η∆Q) + c+ cA] = 0 (19)
The claim is verified by noting from (16) that this η also solves ωm(δ, η) =
ωV +q11η∆Q, and hence solves ωm(δ, η) = ωA(δ, η). Substituting for us(η) =
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ηQL + q00η∆Q in (19) we obtain
ηa =
δ [ωV − c− cA]
QL − δ (q11 − q00)∆Q
(for QL − δ (q11 − q00)∆Q > 0)
We have here tacitly assumed QL − δ (q11 − q00)∆Q > 0; otherwise we will
have ωm(δ, η) > ωA(δ, η) for all η > 0.
We see that ηa > ηm, that ηa and ηm are both increasing in δ, and that
ηa < ηs for δ = 1 iﬀ (12) holds. This proves (11) and the ensuing statement
in the lemma.
Now we will show that the asserted minimum cost can be attained by
nonnegative bonuses that satisfy IC and EA.
First, for η ≤ ηm let the bonuses βkl be given by the optimal scheme
for verifiable output. This scheme satisfies IC and yields wage cost ωV =
q11cA
q11−q10 > 0. The scheme has nonnegative bonuses (βHH > βLH ≥ βHL =
βLL = 0) and satisfies EA, since we for η ≤ ηm by definition of ηm (see (18))
have
η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us(η)− ωV + c+ cA] ≤ 0 ≤ βkl
This shows that for for η ≤ ηm the lower bound ωV is attainable.
For η > ηm the EA constraint is violated if βHL = 0, hence the above
scheme is no longer feasible. Note that by definition of ωm(δ, η), a set of
bonuses will yield wage cost ω = ωm(δ, η) if (i) ICa is binding, which yields
equality in (3), and (ii) βLL = 0 and EA binds for βHL, which yields equality
in (8). Define such a set of bonuses, specifically; let βLH = βLL = 0, and let
βHL, βHH be given by EA and ICa; thus
βHL = η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us(η)− ωm(δ, η) + c+ cA] (EAm)
q11 (βHH − βHL) =
cA
(q11 − q10)
(ICa)
These bonuses then yield cost ω = ωm(δ, η). The bonus βHL satisfies EA by
construction, and since βHH > βHL, so does βHH . From the definition of
βHL and (16) we see that ωm(δ, η)− ωV = q11βHL, and hence that βHL > 0,
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since η > ηm. Moreover, the bonuses satisfy ICe, since we have
q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)
= q11
µ
βHL +
cA
(q11 − q10) q11
¶
+ (1− q11)βHL
>
cA
(q11 − q10)
and cAq11−q10 >
cE
q11−q01 by assumption A1.
It remains to verify that βLH = βLL = 0 satisfy EA. We show that this
is the case for η ≤ ηa. Recall that ωm(δ, η) ≤ ωV + q11η∆Q for η ≤ ηa, and
hence that (16) then implies
ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us − ωm(δ, η) + c+ cA] ≤ 0
This shows that βLH = βLL = 0 satisfy EA for η ≤ ηa. Hence we have shown
that for ηm < η ≤ ηa there is a set of non-negative bonuses that satisfies EA
and IC, and which yields wage costs ω = ωm(δ, η) on this interval.
Finally consider η > ηa. We now derive a set of bonuses that yield the cost
ωA(δ, η), satisfy EA for all outcomes, and satisfy IC. The first requirement
follows by definition of ωA(δ, η) once ICa is binding and EA binds for the
bonuses βLL and βHL. So define the bonuses as follows:
βLL = βLH = ηQL +
δ
1− δ [us − ωA(δ, η) + c+ cA] , βHL = η∆Q+ βLL
(EAA)
q11 (βHH − βHL) + (1− q11) (βLH − βLL) =
cA
(q11 − q10)
(ICa)
This yields βHH = βHL +
cA
(q11−q10)q11 > βHL = η∆Q + βLH , and shows that
βHH also satisfies EA.
To verify that the bonuses are positive, note from the definition of βLL
and (17) that we have ωA(δ, η) = ωV + q11η∆Q + βLL. This shows that
βLL > 0, since we have ωA(δ, η) > ωV +q11η∆Q for η > ηa. (We showed that
ωA(δ, η) = ωV + q11η∆Q for η = ηa, and the inequality then follows from
linearity and ωA(δ, η) < ωV for η small.)
It then only remains to verify that the given bonuses satisfy ICe. We
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have now
q11 (βHH − βLH) + (1− q11) (βHL − βLL)
= q11
µ
βHL +
cA
(q11 − q10) q11
− βLH
¶
+ (1− q11)η∆Q
=
cA
q11 − q10
+ η∆Q
which exceeds cq11−q01 according to assumption A1. The given bonuses thus
satisfy IC, they are positive and satisfy EA, and they yield the cost ωA(δ, η)for
η > ηa. This completes the proof.
Proof of (13).
By an argument similar to that leading to (2) one sees that the cost to
implement eﬀort alone (with no help) must satisfy
ω10 ≥
q10c
q10 − q00
+ q11βLH + (1− q11)βLL (20)
Limited liability (βkl ≥ 0) shows that ω10 ≥ q10cq10−q00 . Substituting next from
the EA constraints for the bonuses βLH and βLL (with ω = ω10 and cA = 0)
in (20) we obtain
ω10 ≥
q10c
q10 − q00
+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ (us − ω10 + c)
Collecting terms involving ω10 yields the inequality ω10 ≥ ω0(δ, η) with
ω0(δ, η) defined in (14). This proves (13).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the limiting case η = 0. Then the EA constraints do not bind,
and the optimal bonuses for the verifiable case can be implemented if they
satisfy EP. From Lemma 1 and assumption A1 these bonuses satisfy βLL =
βHL = 0 and ICa binding, hence we have q11βHH + (1− q11)βLH = cA(q11−q10) .
In addition ICe holds, i.e. q11 (βHH − βLH) ≥ c(q11−q01) .
These bonuses are easiest to implement when βHH is minimal, which is
obtained when ICe binds. This yields
βHH − βLH =
c
q11 (q11 − q01)
, βLH =
cA
(q11 − q10)
− c
(q11 − q01)
(21)
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For η = 0 EP takes the following form
βkl + βlk ≤
2δ
1− δ
∙
1
2
Π11 −QL − q00∆Q
¸
(By assumption the latter square bracket, which equals q11
h
∆Q− cA
(q11−q10)
i
−
q00∆Q is positive.) For the bonuses given above we have βHH > βLH >
βHL = βLL = 0. Hence EP for outcome HH is the critical condition for
implementation, thus we must have
2βHH ≤
2δ
1− δ
∙
1
2
Π11 −QL − q00∆Q
¸
(22)
Substituting for βHH , we see that there is a critical δ0 < 1 such that this
condition holds for all δ > δ0. The other EP conditions are then also satisfied,
hence we have shown that the bonuses that yield wage costs ωV and profits
Π11 are implementable for δ > δ0. This proves the proposition for η = 0. By
continuity the result will also hold for η > 0 suﬃciently close to zero.
Proof of Lemma 4.
First note that condition (12) ensures that for η close to ηs the cost
function for the contract inducing eﬀort and help is given by ωA(δ, η) for all
δ ≤ 1. (More precisely; taking also EP into account, that eﬀort and help can
not be implemented at a cost lower than ωA(δ, η).) This can be seen from
Lemma 3, since (12) implies that ηa(δ) ≤ ηa(1) < ηs, and hence that for
ηa(1) < η < ηs the minimal cost is given by ωA(δ, η) for all δ < 1.
Now consider the comparison of the two contracts. Regarding the eﬀort-
alone contract, it follows from the analysis in Kvaløy and Olsen (2007) that
the following statement holds true. There is η0 < ηs such that for every
η ∈ (η0, ηs) there is a critical δ(η) such that eﬀort-alone can be implemented
at minimal cost ω0(δ, η) for δ ≥ δ(η), and moreover that δ(η)→ 0 as η → ηs.
For completeness we verify this statement below.
Taking the statement for granted, consider η > max{η0, ηa(1)}, where
the relevant costs are ωA(δ, η) and ω0(δ, η), respectively. Define
D(η) ≡ ΠR11(δ(η), η)−ΠR10(δ(η), η).
Since δ(η)→ 0 as η → ηs, it follows from (15) thatD(η)→ D0 < 0 as η → ηs.
Hence by continuity there is η1 < ηs such that for every η ∈ (η1, ηs) we have
D(η) < 0. For such a η, we thus have ΠR11(δ, η) < ΠR10(δ, η) for δ = δ(η).
Hence by continuity there is δ¯(η) > δ(η) such that ΠR11(δ, η) < ΠR10(δ, η) for
δ ∈ (δ(η), δ¯(η)). This verifies the statement in Lemma 4.
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We finally verify the claim regarding the eﬀort-alone contract stated
above. As noted in the text, the minimal wage cost, subject to EA and
IC for the eﬀort-alone contract is ω0(δ, η) defined in (14), provided that this
cost ω0(δ, η) exceeds q10cq10−q00 , which is the cost to implement eﬀort (and no
help) in the verifiable case. Substituting us = η(QL + q00∆Q) in (14) we
obtain
ω0(δ, η)−
q10c
q10 − q00
= ηQL − δ
µ
c
q10 − q00
− η∆Q
¶
q00
This expression is positive for all δ < 1 if η > η0 =
c
q10−q00
1
∆Q+QL/q00
. We see
that η0 < ηs =
c
q10−q00
1
∆Q . Hence for η ∈ (η0, ηs) we have ω0(δ, η) >
q10c
q10−q00
for all δ < 1, and ω0(δ, η) is then indeed the minimal cost to implement
eﬀort-alone, subject to the relevant IC and EA constraints. Moreover, the
discussion leading up to Proposition 2 showed that the critical discount factor
δ(η) for implementing the eﬀort-alone contract converges to zero when η →
ηs. (Kvaløy and Olsen (2007) shows that this critical factor is given by
1/δ−1 = k/ [c− η∆Q (q10 − q00)] where k is indenpendent of η.) This verifies
the claim, and thus completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.
From Proposition 1 we know that there is a critical δ(η) < 1 such that
for η suﬃciently small and δ > δ(η) the contract inducing eﬀort and help is
implementable and optimal;
ΠR11(δ, η)−ΠR10(δ, η) > 0 for 0 ≤ η < η1 and δ > δ(η). (23)
Letting η → 0, then by continuity δ(η) → δ0, where δ0 is the critical
factor corresponding to η = 0 defined in the proof of Proposition 1. From
that proof (see (22)) we have δ0 defined by
βHH =
δ0
1− δ0
∙
1
2
Π11 −QL − q00∆Q
¸
=
δ0
1− δ0
∙
(q11 − q00)∆Q−
q11cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
where we have substituted for Π11, and where βHH is given by (see (21)):
βHH =
c
q11 (q11 − q01)
+ βLH =
c
q11 (q11 − q01)
+
cA
(q11 − q10)
− c
(q11 − q01)
=
(1− q11)c
q11 (q11 − q01)
+
cA
(q11 − q10)
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The critical factor δ0 is thus given by the following equation
∙
(1− q11)c
q11 (q11 − q01)
+
cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
=
δ0
1− δ0
∙
(q11 − q00)∆Q−
q11cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
(d0)
From Lemma 4 we know that, under the stated assumptions the contract
inducing eﬀort only is implementable and optimal for η suﬃciently large, and
for δ ∈ (δ(η), δ¯(η)):
ΠR11(δ, η)−ΠR10(δ, η) < 0 for η2 < η < ηs and δ ∈ (δ(η), δ¯(η)). (24)
Here δ(η) is the critical factor for implementing the ’only eﬀort’ contract,
and we know that δ(η) → 0 as η → ηs. Since ΠR11(δ, η) − ΠR10(δ, η) is linear
in δ, and positive for δ = 1, it must be the case that (the largest) δ¯(η) is
defined by ΠR11(δ, η)−ΠR10(δ, η) = 0 for δ = δ¯(η). Hence, letting η → ηs, then
by continuity δ¯(η)→ δ1 defined by ΠR11(δ1, ηs)−ΠR10(δ1, ηs) = 0, i.e. by
(q11 − q10)∆Q− (ωA(δ1, ηs)− ω0(δ1, ηs)) = 0 (d1)
The proof is then complete if we show that (for a set of parameters)
δ1 > δ0, because for given δ ∈ (δ0, δ1) we can then by continuity find η1 > 0
and η2 < ηs such that both (23) and (24) hold for the given δ.
Consider the equation (d1) defining δ1. Using first (10) and (14), and
then ηs∆Q =
c
q10−q00 we obtain
ωA(δ, ηs)− ω0(δ, ηs) = (1− δ)
∙
q11cA
q11 − q10
+ q11ηs∆Q−
q10c
q10 − q00
¸
+ δ [cA]
= (1− δ)
∙
q11cA
q11 − q10
+
(q11 − q10)c
q10 − q00
¸
+ δ [cA]
Substituting this in the equation (d1) defining δ1, this equation becomes
(q11 − q10)∆Q−
µ
q11cA
(q11 − q10)
+
(q11 − q10) c
(q10 − q00)
¶
+δ1
∙
(q11 − q10)c
(q10 − q00)
+
q10cA
(q11 − q10)
¸
= 0 (d1)
We will consider the additive model (4). The equations defining δ0 and
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δ1 then take the following form
∙
1− q11
q11
c
r
+
cA
s
¸
=
δ0
1− δ0
h
(r + s)∆Q− q11cA
s
i
(d0)
s∆Q−
³q11cA
s
+
sc
r
´
+ δ1
hsc
r
+
q10cA
s
i
= 0 (d1)
where q11 = r + s + q00 and q10 = r + q00, and the assumptions A0 and A1
entail
cA
s
>
c
r
and
r + q00
s
(
cA
s
− c
r
) < ∆Q− cA
s
<
r + q00
s
cA
s
+
c
r
(A)
Condition (12) involves QL, and can be fulfilled independently of the other
conditions. For the additive model we have ηs =
c
r∆Q , and we see that
condition (12) is then (for cAs >
c
r) equivalent to
QL > (r + s)∆Q+
h
q11
cA
s
− c− cA
i
/ηs = (r + s)∆Q+
h
(r + q00)
cA
s
/
c
r
− r
i
∆Q
(25)
Define
γ =
∆Q
cA/s
> 1, α =
c/r
cA/s
< 1
and note that q10 = r + q00 = q11 − s. Then the conditions defining δ0 and
δ1 above are
sγ − (q11 + sα) + δ1 [sα+ (q11 − s)] = 0 (d1)∙
1− q11
q11
α+ 1
¸
=
δ0
1− δ0
[(r + s)γ − q11] (d0)
where
1 > α and
q11 − s
s
(1− α) < γ − 1 < q11 − s
s
+ α (A)
We will now show that, keeping q11, γ and r fixed, then for s suﬃciently
small there is α close to 1 such that (A) holds and 0 < δ0 < δ1. To see this,
let α→ 1 and s→ 0 such that 1−αs ≤ k, where q11k < γ − 1, and γ > q11/r.
Then we obtain
δ1 =
(q11 + sα)− sγ
[sα+ q11 − s]
→ 1
δ0 =
h
1−q11
q11
α+ 1
i
h
1−q11
q11
α+ 1
i
+ [(r + s)γ − q11]
→ 1
1 + [rγ − q11] q11
< 1
Moreover, condition (A) will clearly hold for s small and α close to 1 since
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q11−s
s (1− α) ≤ q11k + (1− α) < γ − 1 and
q11−s
s + α → ∞. This completes
the proof.
Remark. The following is an example of parameters that yield δ0 < δ1:
q11 = 0.9, r = 0.45, s = 0.1, γ =
∆Q
cA/s
= 3, α =
c/r
cA/s
= 0.9
For these parameters we find δ0 = 0.746 and δ1 = 0.775. Checking
condition (A), we see that q11−ss (1−α) = 0.8 < γ − 1 <
q11−s
s +α = 8.9, and
hence this condition is satisfied.
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